Napoleon: Difference between revisions
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==Impact on Europe== | ==Impact on Europe== | ||
Broers (1996) | Broers (1996) distinguishes the "inner" and "outer" empire. The "Inner" Empire included France itself and Belgium, the Netherlands, the Rhinelands, most of western Germany, Switzerland, and northern Italy. These areas were integrated into an efficiently administered and largely obedient bloc. Napoleon sought to rally hostile political factions of both right and left to his rule (ralliement), as well as to fuse them into a loyal administrative class. In return for their services and obedience, Napoleon offered this new elite social order a coherent legal code and protection of their property. | ||
The "outer" empire, comprised the German Hanseatic territories, former Papal States, Illyrian provinces, and the kingdom of Spain (ruled by his brother Joseph Bonaparte). It displayed little enthusiasm for French occupation and resented the imposition of high taxes, enforcement of the Continental blockade against trade with England and America, application of the Concordat with the Pope to protect the Catholic Church, and especially, conscription demands to supply troops for the Grande Armee, such as the 300,000 lost in Russia in 1812. In the Outer Empire banditry flourished, elites refused to cooperate with the occupier, and the forces of counterrevolution remained active. Napoleonic rule rested on an insecure alliance of local collaborators and French administrators, both of whom were unpopular with their subjects. Grab (1996) shows heart of the French occupation of Europe was a combination of reform and exploitation designed to extract men and money more efficiently from the subject states. | The "outer" empire, comprised the German Hanseatic territories, former Papal States, Illyrian provinces, and the kingdom of Spain (ruled by his brother Joseph Bonaparte). It displayed little enthusiasm for French occupation and resented the imposition of high taxes, enforcement of the Continental blockade against trade with England and America, application of the Concordat with the Pope to protect the Catholic Church, and especially, conscription demands to supply troops for the Grande Armee, such as the 300,000 lost in Russia in 1812. In the Outer Empire banditry flourished, elites refused to cooperate with the occupier, and the forces of counterrevolution remained active. Napoleonic rule rested on an insecure alliance of local collaborators and French administrators, both of whom were unpopular with their subjects. Grab (1996) shows heart of the French occupation of Europe was a combination of reform and exploitation designed to extract men and money more efficiently from the subject states.<ref>Broers (1996) </ref> | ||
Napoleon lifted all restriction on Jews in France and its empire. In Germany and Italy, especially, this marked a dramatic liberation from the ghetto.<ref> Frederic Cople Jaher, ''The Jews and the Nation: Revolution, Emancipation, State Formation, and the Liberal Paradigm in America and France'' (2002) pp 103-37.</ref> | Napoleon lifted all restriction on Jews in France and its empire. In Germany and Italy, especially, this marked a dramatic liberation from the ghetto.<ref> Frederic Cople Jaher, ''The Jews and the Nation: Revolution, Emancipation, State Formation, and the Liberal Paradigm in America and France'' (2002) pp 103-37.</ref> | ||
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Napoleon's extensive and masterful use of propaganda contributed to his rise to power, legitimated his regime, and established his image for posterity. Strict censorship, controlling every aspect of the press, books, theater, and art, was only part of his propaganda scheme, aimed at portraying him as bringing desperately wanted peace and stability to France. The propagandistic rhetoric changed in relation to events and the atmosphere of Napoleon's reign, focusing first on his role as a general in the army and identification as a soldier, and moving to his role as emperor and a civil leader. Specifically targeting his civilian audience, Napoleon fostered an important, though uneasy, relationship with the contemporary art community, taking an active role in commissioning and controlling all forms of art production to suit his propaganda goals.<ref>Forrest (2004) </ref> | Napoleon's extensive and masterful use of propaganda contributed to his rise to power, legitimated his regime, and established his image for posterity. Strict censorship, controlling every aspect of the press, books, theater, and art, was only part of his propaganda scheme, aimed at portraying him as bringing desperately wanted peace and stability to France. The propagandistic rhetoric changed in relation to events and the atmosphere of Napoleon's reign, focusing first on his role as a general in the army and identification as a soldier, and moving to his role as emperor and a civil leader. Specifically targeting his civilian audience, Napoleon fostered an important, though uneasy, relationship with the contemporary art community, taking an active role in commissioning and controlling all forms of art production to suit his propaganda goals.<ref>Forrest (2004) </ref> | ||
Hazareesingh (2004) explores how Napoleon's image and memory is best understood when considered within its sociopolitical context. It played a key role in collective political defiance of the Bourbon restoration monarchy in 1815-30. People from all walks of life and all areas of France, particularly Napoleonic veterans, drew on the Napoleonic legacy and its connections with the ideals of the 1789 revolution. Widespread rumors of Napoleon's return from St. Helena and Napoleon as an inspiration for patriotism, individual and collective liberties, and political mobilization manifested themselves in seditious materials, notably displaying the tricolor and rosettes, and subversive activities celebrating anniversaries of Napoleon's life and reign and disrupting royal celebrations, and demonstrated the prevailing and successful goal of the varied supporters of Napoleon to constantly destabilize the Bourbon regime. | Hazareesingh (2004) explores how Napoleon's image and memory is best understood when considered within its sociopolitical context. It played a key role in collective political defiance of the Bourbon restoration monarchy in 1815-30. People from all walks of life and all areas of France, particularly Napoleonic veterans, drew on the Napoleonic legacy and its connections with the ideals of the 1789 revolution. Widespread rumors of Napoleon's return from St. Helena and Napoleon as an inspiration for patriotism, individual and collective liberties, and political mobilization manifested themselves in seditious materials, notably displaying the tricolor and rosettes, and subversive activities celebrating anniversaries of Napoleon's life and reign and disrupting royal celebrations, and demonstrated the prevailing and successful goal of the varied supporters of Napoleon to constantly destabilize the Bourbon regime.<ref> Hazareesingh (2004) </ref> | ||
Datta (2005) shows that following the | Datta (2005) shows that following the collapse of militaristic Boulangism in the late 1880s, the Napoleonic legend was divorced from party politics and revived in popular culture. Concentrating on two plays and two novels from the period - Victorien Sardou's ''Madame Sans-Gêne'' (1893), Maurice Barrès's ''Les Déracinés'' (1897), Edmond Rostand's ''L'Aiglon'' (1900), and Gyp's ''Napoléonette'' (1913) Datta examines how writers and critics of the Belle Epoque exploited the Napoleonic legend for diverse political and cultural ends. Reduced to a minor character, the new fictional Napoleon was not a world historical figure but an intimate one fashioned by each individual's needs and consumed as popular entertainment. In their attempts to represent the emperor as a figure of national unity, proponents and detractors of the Third Republic used the legend as a vehicle for exploring anxieties about gender and fears about the processes of democratization that accompanied this new era of mass politics and culture.<ref>Venita Datta, "'L'appel Au Soldat': Visions of the Napoleonic Legend in Popular Culture of the Belle Epoque." ''French Historical Studies'' 2005 28(1): 1-30. Issn: 0016-1071 Fulltext: in Ebsco </ref> | ||
==Bibliography== | ==Bibliography== |
Revision as of 16:05, 2 May 2007
Napoleon
Origins
Born Napoleone Buonaparte at Ajaccio, Corsica, on Aug. 15, 1769, he was the second son of Carlo Buonaparte, a lawyer with some claim to noble rank, and Letizia Ramolino. Genoa had just sold Corsica to France. Carlo Buonaparte had fought for Corsican independence under Pasquale Paoli; he now became a supporter of the French regime, which recognized his noble rank. Yet the family never became really French; they spoke Italian (in the Corsican dialect). When the King offered free education to impoverished noble families, Napoleon and several siblings were educated at royal expense. In 1779, after a few months' schooling at Autun to improve his French, Napoleon entered the military academy at Brienne, which was run by a Catholic religious order. He remained there for five years. Taunted by his schoolmates as being provincial from the wildest and most violent part of France, and uncouth, a pauper even among the aristocratic poor, he professed an intense Corsican patriotism and hatred of the French "oppressors." In 1784 he was selected to attend the Ecole Militaire in Paris to study the science and mathematics of artillery. Napoleon was spent the year in luxury such as he had never known before, and graduated 42nd in a class of 130. Commissioned as second lieutenant of artillery, he was sent to Valence in southern France.
There was revolution in the air; Napoleon was an intellectual and an ardent disciple of Voltaire, Rousseau and the philosophes; he saluted the people but hated of mob violence.[1] During his 10 years as a junior officer made 5 extended trips to Corsica, seeking a politico-military career, alongside Paoli or against him. He took prolonged leaves, adding up to three years in seven, sometimes failing to report back on time. In June 1793 Napoleon in Corsica was defeated by the Paolists; he and his family fled to France, joined the French revolutionary cause and forgot Corsica.[2]
Rise to Power
Once the Revolution had begun, so many of the aristocratic officers turned against the Revolutionary government, or were exiled or executed, that a vacuum of senior leadership resulted. Napoleon was loyal to the revolution and his demerits were overlooked. Napoleon was twice reinstated, promoted, and allowed to collect his back pay. He known as an intellectual deeply involved in politics. His first test of military genius came at Toulon in 1793, as the British had seized this key port. Napoleon, used his artillery to force the British to abandon the city. The acting Lieutenant-Colonel was immediately promoted by the Jacobin radicals under Robespierre to brigadier-general, joining the ranks of several brilliant young generals. He became the operational planner for the Army of Italy and planned two successful attacks in April 1794.[3]
The days of Brumaire sounded the end of the short-lived Republic: no more representative government, assemblies, a collegial executive, or liberty.[4]
Military Operations to 1805
Military Operations 1805-1815
Impact on France
Napoleon centralized power in Paris, with all the provinces governed all-powerful prefects whom he selected. They were more powerful than royal intendants of the ancien régime and had a long-term impact in unifying the nation, minimizing regional differences, and shifting all decisions to Paris.[5]
Of permanent importance was the Code Napoléon (1806), created by eminent jurists under Napoleon';s supervision. Praised for its Gallic clarity, it spread rapidly throughout Europe and the world in general. The Code recognized the principles of civil liberty, equality before the law, and the secular character of the state. It discarded the old right of primogeniture (where only the eldest son inherited) and ruled that inheritances should be divided equally among all the children. The court system was standardized, with all judges appointed by Paris. The Catholic system was reestablished by the the Concordat of 1801 (signed with Pope Pius VII), so that church life returned to normal; the church lands were not restored, but the Jesuits were allowed back in and the bitter fights between the government and Church ended. Protestant and atheists were tolerated. [6]
The French taxation system had collapsed in the 1780s. In the 1790s the government seized and sold church lands and lands of exiles aristocrats. Napoleon instituted a modern, efficient tax system that guaranteed a steady flow of revenues and made long-term financing possible. He kept the system of conscription that had been created in the 1790s, so that every young man served in the army, which could be rapidly expanded even as it was based on a core of careerists and talented officers. Before the Revolution the aristocracy formed the officer corps. Now promotion was by merit and achievement--every private carried a marshall's baton, it was said.[7]
Impact on Europe
Broers (1996) distinguishes the "inner" and "outer" empire. The "Inner" Empire included France itself and Belgium, the Netherlands, the Rhinelands, most of western Germany, Switzerland, and northern Italy. These areas were integrated into an efficiently administered and largely obedient bloc. Napoleon sought to rally hostile political factions of both right and left to his rule (ralliement), as well as to fuse them into a loyal administrative class. In return for their services and obedience, Napoleon offered this new elite social order a coherent legal code and protection of their property.
The "outer" empire, comprised the German Hanseatic territories, former Papal States, Illyrian provinces, and the kingdom of Spain (ruled by his brother Joseph Bonaparte). It displayed little enthusiasm for French occupation and resented the imposition of high taxes, enforcement of the Continental blockade against trade with England and America, application of the Concordat with the Pope to protect the Catholic Church, and especially, conscription demands to supply troops for the Grande Armee, such as the 300,000 lost in Russia in 1812. In the Outer Empire banditry flourished, elites refused to cooperate with the occupier, and the forces of counterrevolution remained active. Napoleonic rule rested on an insecure alliance of local collaborators and French administrators, both of whom were unpopular with their subjects. Grab (1996) shows heart of the French occupation of Europe was a combination of reform and exploitation designed to extract men and money more efficiently from the subject states.[8]
Napoleon lifted all restriction on Jews in France and its empire. In Germany and Italy, especially, this marked a dramatic liberation from the ghetto.[9]
After overcoming the forces of the coalition in 1807, Napoleon decided to create a powerful outpost of his empire in Eastern Europe. He established the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which depended on France from the very beginning. The duchy consisted of lands seized in Russia, Austria, and Prussia. He gave some support to the Polish struggle with Russia, which wanted to keep Poland within its sphere of power. The addition of west Galicia to the duchy of Warsaw by the peace of Vienna, had caused Czar Alexander anxiety lest the restoration of Poland should be contemplated, and this was a factor that led to Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812.
Personality
All historians agree that Napoleon's remarkable personality was one key to his influence. Chandler starts with his hypnotic personality; although not physically imposing, in one-on-one situations he immediately had a hypnotic impact on people and seemingly bent the strongest leaders to his will. Second his intellectual powers were unrivaled. He had a photographic memory for facts, people, events, numbers, military units and maps. He devoured statistical information and reports, memorized maps, and had a perfect recall of a fantastic stock of information. He had a thorough command of military technology, as well as the financial and diplomatic secrets of France. He could instantly organize and integrate all that information, generating brilliant insights on complex situations. He could organize his own thoughts and rapidly dictate a series of complex commands to all his subordinates, keeping in mind where each major unit was expected to be at every future point, and like a chess master, "seeing" the best plays many moves ahead. Combined with his inexhaustible energy, he kept relays of staff and secretaries at work. Unlike many generals Napoleon did not turn to history to ask what Hannibal or Alexander or whoever did in a similar situation.
After 1812 Napoleon seems to have lost his old verve. On the great Russian campaign of 1812, with crisis after crisis at hand, he rarely rose to the occasion. After that debacle compatriots noticed a loss of the old flair. Some historians have suggested a physical deterioration, but others note that an impaired Napoleon was still a brilliant general. [10]
In terms of impact on events, it was more than Napoleon's personality that took effect. He chose outstanding generals, and stood by them. He reorganized France itself to supply the men and money needed for great wars. Above all he inspired his men--Wellington said his presence on the battlefield was worth 40,000 soldiers,[11] for he inspired confidence from privates to field marshals. The force of his personalities neutralized material difficulties as his soldiers fought with the confidence that with Napoleon in charge they would surely win.[12]
Propaganda and memory
Napoleon's extensive and masterful use of propaganda contributed to his rise to power, legitimated his regime, and established his image for posterity. Strict censorship, controlling every aspect of the press, books, theater, and art, was only part of his propaganda scheme, aimed at portraying him as bringing desperately wanted peace and stability to France. The propagandistic rhetoric changed in relation to events and the atmosphere of Napoleon's reign, focusing first on his role as a general in the army and identification as a soldier, and moving to his role as emperor and a civil leader. Specifically targeting his civilian audience, Napoleon fostered an important, though uneasy, relationship with the contemporary art community, taking an active role in commissioning and controlling all forms of art production to suit his propaganda goals.[13]
Hazareesingh (2004) explores how Napoleon's image and memory is best understood when considered within its sociopolitical context. It played a key role in collective political defiance of the Bourbon restoration monarchy in 1815-30. People from all walks of life and all areas of France, particularly Napoleonic veterans, drew on the Napoleonic legacy and its connections with the ideals of the 1789 revolution. Widespread rumors of Napoleon's return from St. Helena and Napoleon as an inspiration for patriotism, individual and collective liberties, and political mobilization manifested themselves in seditious materials, notably displaying the tricolor and rosettes, and subversive activities celebrating anniversaries of Napoleon's life and reign and disrupting royal celebrations, and demonstrated the prevailing and successful goal of the varied supporters of Napoleon to constantly destabilize the Bourbon regime.[14]
Datta (2005) shows that following the collapse of militaristic Boulangism in the late 1880s, the Napoleonic legend was divorced from party politics and revived in popular culture. Concentrating on two plays and two novels from the period - Victorien Sardou's Madame Sans-Gêne (1893), Maurice Barrès's Les Déracinés (1897), Edmond Rostand's L'Aiglon (1900), and Gyp's Napoléonette (1913) Datta examines how writers and critics of the Belle Epoque exploited the Napoleonic legend for diverse political and cultural ends. Reduced to a minor character, the new fictional Napoleon was not a world historical figure but an intimate one fashioned by each individual's needs and consumed as popular entertainment. In their attempts to represent the emperor as a figure of national unity, proponents and detractors of the Third Republic used the legend as a vehicle for exploring anxieties about gender and fears about the processes of democratization that accompanied this new era of mass politics and culture.[15]
Bibliography
- Biographies
- Asprey, Robert. The Rise of Napoleon Bonaparte and The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte. (2002); 2 vol, 1200pp well-written popular biography focusing on the military
- Barnett, Corelli. Bonaparte (1978), hostile
- Emsley, Clive. Napoleon 2003 142 pp, very succinct coverage of life, France and empire; little on warfare
- Cronin, Vincent. Napoleon (1971), favorable popular bio
- Ellis, Geoffry. Napoleon (1997)
- Englund, Steven. Napoleon: A Political Life. (2004). 575 pages; the best (and most advanced) political biography; thin on military
- Fisher, Herbert. Napoleon (1913) 256pp old classic online edition
- Fournier, August. Napoleon the First: A Biography (1903); 836 pages online edition
- Herold, J. Christopher. The Age of Napoleon (1963) 480pp, stress on empire and diplomacy
- Lefebvre, Georges: Napoleon, 1969, French perspective
- Markham, Felix. Napoleon 1963. 304pp online edition
- McLynn, Frank. Napoleon: A Biography (2003) 752pp, stress on military
- Rose, John Holland. The Life of Napoleon I: Including New Materials from the British Official Records, (2 vol 1903), old but solid scholarship; online editon vol 1 online editon vol 2
- Schom, Alan. Napoleon Bonaparte: A Life (1997), 944pp; very hostile; argues Napoleon was a paranoiac psychopath
- Thompson, J. M. Napoleon (1954), famous classic, well-balanced
- Military
- Adkin, Mark. The Waterloo Companion: The Complete Guide to History's Most Famous Land Battle (2002) 448pp
- Chandler, David. The Campaigns of Napoleon: the Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier (1973), 1216pp; best military synthesis
- Chandler, David. Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars (1993)
- Connelly, Owen. Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns (2006)
- Dodge, Theodore Ayrault. Napoleon; A History of the Art of War (1904), old classic online edition
- Elting, John R. Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armee (1997)
- Esdaile, Charles J. The Wars of Napoleon (1995)
- Esdaile, Charles J. The French Wars 1792-1815. (2001). 96pp online edition
- Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. ed. The Encyclopedia of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: A Political, Social, and Military History (ABC-CLIO: 3 vol 2006)
- Gates, David. The Napoleonic Wars, 1803-1815 (1997)
- Goetz, Robert. 1805: Austerlitz; Napoleon and the Destruction of the Third Coalition (2005). 368pp
- Greiss, Thomas E. West Point Atlas for the Wars of Napoleon (1986) 70pp; all maps are online
- Kagan, Frederick W. The End of the Old Order: Napoleon And Europe, 1801-1805 (2006) first of four promised volumes; covers the strengths and strategies of all the powers
- Nofi, Albert A. The Waterloo Campaign, June 1815. 1993. 333pp online edition
- Paret, peter. "Napoleon and the Revolution of War," in Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy (1986)
- Pericoli, Ugo.1815: The Armies at Waterloo (1973)
- Rogers, H.C.B. Napoleon's Army (1974)
- Rothenberg, Gunther. The Napoleonic Wars (2006) 240pp
- Rothenberg, Gunther. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon 1978
- Schneid, Frederick C. Napoleon's Italian Campaigns: 1805-1815. (2002); 229pp online edition
- Tarle, Eugene. Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812. 1942. online edition
Impact on France
- Bergeron, Louis. France under Napoleon (1981), French viewpoint
- Forrest, Alan. "Propaganda and the Legitimation of Power in Napoleonic France." French History, 2004 18(4): 426-445. Issn: 0269-1191 Fulltext: in OUP journals
- Fremont-Barnes, Gregory, ed. The Encyclopedia of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: A Political, Social, and Military History (ABC-CLIO: 3 vol 2006)
- Furet, François. The French Revolution, 1770-1814 (1996), pp 211-65 on Napoleon
- Furet, François and Mona Ozouf, eds. A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution (1989), 1120pp; long essays by scholars; conservative perspective
- Goubert, Pierre. The Course of French History. 1991; French textbook; ch. 14 online edition
- Lyons, Martyn. Napoleon and the Legacy of the Revolution (1994)
- Paxton, John. Companion to the French Revolution (1987), hundreds of short entries.
- Scott, Samuel F. and Barry Rothaus. Historical Dictionary of the French Revolution, 1789-1799 (1984), short essays by scholars
- Sutherland, D.M.G. France 1789-1815 (1985)
Diplomacy and impact on Europe
- Broers, Michael. Europe under Napoleon 1799-1815 (1996) 291pp, covers everything except the battles
- Bruun, Geoffrey. Europe and the French Imperium, 1799-1814 1938. excellent survey of all of Europe
- Ellis, Geoffrey. The Napoleonic Empire (1991)
- Grab, Alexander. Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 249, maps; excellent synthesis
- Hill, Peter P. Napoleon's Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815 (2005)
- Lyons, Martyn. Napoleon and the Legacy of the Revolution (1994)
- Rothenberg, Gunther E. "The Origins, Causes, and Extension of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, (Spring, 1988), pp. 771-793 in JSTOR
- Rude, George F. and Harvey J. Kaye.Revolutionary Europe, 1783-1815' (2000), survey
- Schroeder, Paul. The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848. 1996; Elaborate detail; advanced history; very hostile to Napoleon; online edition
- Woolf, Stuart. Napoleon's Integration of Europe (1991) 320pp online edition
- Cambridge Modern History (1907) vol 9: Napoleon online edition, older articles by scholars, 900pp
Historiography and Memory
- Dunne, John. "Napoleon: For or against ... and Beyond." History Review. Issue: 27. 1997. pp 17+. online edition
- Geyl, Pieter. Napoleon: For and Aquinst (1949) online edition
- Hazareesingh, Sudhir. "Memory and Political Imagination: the Legend of Napoleon Revisited." French History, 2004 18(4): 463-483. Issn: 0269-1191 Fulltext: in Oxford up
- Pinkney, David. (ed.), Napoleon: Historical Enigma (1969)
Primary Sources
- Dwyer, Philip G. and Peter Mcphee, eds. The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook. (2002) 213pp online edition
Online resources
- Richard Jensen, ed. Web Sources for Military History (2006)
- War, terror and Resistance
- Napoleon Bonaparte: Internet Guide
- ↑ Englund pp 29-33
- ↑ Englund ch 1-3
- ↑ Englund pp 63-73
- ↑ Furet (1996) p 212
- ↑ Goubert (1991) ch 14
- ↑ Goubert (1991) ch 14
- ↑ Goubert (1991) ch 14
- ↑ Broers (1996)
- ↑ Frederic Cople Jaher, The Jews and the Nation: Revolution, Emancipation, State Formation, and the Liberal Paradigm in America and France (2002) pp 103-37.
- ↑ Chandler (1973) xxxiv-xli
- ↑ Thompson (1951) p 285
- ↑ Englund (2004) pp 379ff
- ↑ Forrest (2004)
- ↑ Hazareesingh (2004)
- ↑ Venita Datta, "'L'appel Au Soldat': Visions of the Napoleonic Legend in Popular Culture of the Belle Epoque." French Historical Studies 2005 28(1): 1-30. Issn: 0016-1071 Fulltext: in Ebsco