U.S. intelligence activities in Cambodia: Difference between revisions
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{{main|CIA activities in Asia-Pacific}} | {{main|CIA activities in Asia-Pacific}} | ||
This article discusses | This article discusses activities of the United States intelligence community specific to Cambodia, and multinational matters, such as [[U.S. intelligence and global health]], not specific to [[Southeast Asia]] or the Asia-Pacific region. | ||
== | ==National== | ||
===Cambodia 1954=== | ===Cambodia 1954=== | ||
A National Intelligence Estimate of August 3 projected relatively little Communist activity in [[Cambodia]] as Viet Minh withdraw. With outside help, the Cambodians should be able to build a security apparatus.<ref name= | A National Intelligence Estimate of August 3 projected relatively little Communist activity in [[Cambodia]] as Viet Minh withdraw. With outside help, the Cambodians should be able to build a security apparatus.<ref name=NIE63-5-54>{{citation | ||
| author = Central Intelligence Agency | | author = Central Intelligence Agency | ||
| title = NIE 63-5-54: Post-Geneva Outlook in Indochina | | title = NIE 63-5-54: Post-Geneva Outlook in Indochina | ||
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===Cambodia 1967=== | ===Cambodia 1967=== | ||
President [[Richard Nixon]] asked | President [[Richard Nixon]] asked Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs [[Henry Kissinger]] to explore two potential CIA actions in Cambodia: | ||
:#Creating covert paramilitary harassing operations directed against North | :#Creating covert paramilitary harassing operations directed against [[People's Army of North Vietnam]] in the sanctuary areas just over the Cambodian border | ||
:#CIA capability for eliminating or reducing the arms traffic through Cambodia to communist forces in South Vietnam. | :#CIA capability for eliminating or reducing the arms traffic through Cambodia to communist forces in South Vietnam. | ||
After discussion in the [[303 Committee]], which was then the approval group for US covert actions, the committee endorsed the first, although the CIA recommended against it for two reasons. They believed it would take effort away from operations in South Vietnam, and also would have questionable effectiveness but high cost against the large North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. | After discussion in the [[303 Committee]], which was then the approval group for US covert actions, the committee endorsed the first, although the CIA recommended against it for two reasons. They believed it would take effort away from operations in South Vietnam, and also would have questionable effectiveness but high cost against the large North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. | ||
As far as the second, CIA has identified a number of Cambodian army officers who are actively involved in supporting communist forces in South Vietnam, but does not now have direct, secure and controlled access to any of these officers. They doubt any of the officers involved in the arms traffic would be now susceptible to bribery both because of the profits accruing to them from such operations as well as the personal political risks entailed in a relationship involving the United States. Further, they pointed out that if recent U.S. diplomatic approaches to Cambodia result in the formal resumption of full diplomatic relations, CIA will gain an operating base for improved intelligence collection and covert action. With such a base, they would have a better chance to convince [[Prince Sihanouk]] that it is in his best interest to make an honest effort to reduce or halt the arms traffic. | As far as the second, CIA has identified a number of Cambodian army officers who are actively involved in supporting communist forces in South Vietnam, but does not now have direct, secure and controlled access to any of these officers. They doubt any of the officers involved in the arms traffic would be now susceptible to bribery both because of the profits accruing to them from such operations as well as the personal political risks entailed in a relationship involving the United States. Further, they pointed out that if recent U.S. diplomatic approaches to Cambodia result in the formal resumption of full diplomatic relations, CIA will gain an operating base for improved intelligence collection and covert action. With such a base, they would have a better chance to convince [[Norodom Sihanouk|Prince Sihanouk]] that it is in his best interest to make an honest effort to reduce or halt the arms traffic. | ||
Kissinger recommended continuing to monitor rather than taking action. There is no record on file of a Presidential decision on these matters.<ref name=HAK1969-03-17>{{cite web | Kissinger recommended continuing to monitor rather than taking action. There is no record on file of a Presidential decision on these matters.<ref name=HAK1969-03-17>{{cite web | ||
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===Cambodia 1969=== | ===Cambodia 1969=== | ||
A February 19 memorandum from | A February 19 memorandum from Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs [[Henry Kissinger]] to President [[Richard Nixon]] proposed an bombing attack by [[B-52]] aircraft against what was believed to be [[COSVN]] in [[Cambodia]]. In this discussion, specific CIA analysis was not discussed, but Kissinger indicated that he believed the target information to be correct: | ||
<blockquote> | <blockquote> | ||
On February 18, 1969, Mr. H.A. Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, and Colonels Pursley and Haig met in the Secretary of Defense’s conference room and were briefed by a two-officer team from Saigon on the conduct of the proposed [[ARC LIGHT]] strike against the reported location of COSVN Headquarters.<ref name=FRUS-HAK-1969-02-19>{{citation | On February 18, 1969, Mr. H.A. Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, and Colonels Pursley and Haig met in the Secretary of Defense’s conference room and were briefed by a two-officer team from Saigon on the conduct of the proposed [[ARC LIGHT]] strike against the reported location of COSVN Headquarters.<ref name=FRUS-HAK-1969-02-19>{{citation | ||
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}}</ref>, several pertinent observations were made. | }}</ref>, several pertinent observations were made. | ||
[[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]] (CJCS) [[Earle Wheeler]] cited two COSVN Resolutions, with the inference that COSVN existed as an organizational entity. In the subsequent discussion of bombing options, there were no mention of COSVN's physical location. | [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]] (CJCS) General [[Earle Wheeler]] cited two COSVN Resolutions, with the inference that COSVN existed as an organizational entity. In the subsequent discussion of bombing options, there were no mention of COSVN's physical location. | ||
===Cambodia 1970=== | ===Cambodia 1970=== | ||
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| year =2007 | | year =2007 | ||
| title =Legacy of Ashes | | title =Legacy of Ashes | ||
| publisher = | | publisher =Doubleday | ||
| | | ISBN=9780385514453 | ||
}}</ref> claims that in April of 1970, CIA analysts did not find evidence of a North Vietnamese [[COSVN]] headquarters in Cambodia, but that U.S. President [[Richard Nixon]] authorized a ground invasion to locate and destroy a North Vietnamese headquarters in Cambodia should one exist. | }}</ref> claims that in April of 1970, CIA analysts did not find evidence of a North Vietnamese [[COSVN]] headquarters in Cambodia, but that U.S. President [[Richard Nixon]] authorized a ground invasion to locate and destroy a North Vietnamese headquarters in Cambodia should one exist. | ||
| Line 71: | Line 72: | ||
Senator [[Clifford P. Case]] sponsored a law effective December 1972 cutting off funds for CIA and [[private military company]] operations in Cambodia. | Senator [[Clifford P. Case]] sponsored a law effective December 1972 cutting off funds for CIA and [[private military company]] operations in Cambodia. | ||
===Cambodia | ===Cambodia 1980s=== | ||
The [[Reagan Administration]] sought to apply the [[Reagan Doctrine]] of aiding anti-Soviet resistance movements abroad to [[Cambodia]], which was under Vietnamese occupation following the [[Cambodian genocide]] carried out by the communist [[Khmer Rouge]]. The Vietnamese had installed a communist government led by Khmer Rouge dissident Heng Samrin. According to [[Rudolph Rummel|R. J. Rummel]]; the Vietnamese invasion, occupation, puppet regime, ongoing guerrilla warfare, and ensuing famine killed 1.2 million Cambodians in addition to the roughly 2 million who had been killed by the Khmer Rouge.<ref>http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.CHAP4.HTM</ref> The largest resistance movement fighting Cambodia's communist government was largely made up of members of the former Khmer Rouge regime, whose human rights record was among the worst of the 20th century. Therefore, Reagan authorized the provision of aid to a smaller Cambodian resistance movement, a coalition called the [[Khmer People's National Liberation Front]],<ref>Far Eastern Economic Review, December 22, 1988, details the extensive fighting between the U.S.-backed forces and the Khmer Rouge.</ref> known as the KPNLF and then run by [[Son Sann]]; in an effort to force an end to the Vietnamese occupation. Eventually, the Vietnamese withdrew, and Cambodia's communist regime fell.<ref>[http://www.worldandi.com/specialreport/1988/february/Sa13957.htm "Cambodia at a Crossroads", by Michael Johns, ''The World and I'' magazine, February 1988.]</ref> Then, under [[United Nations]] supervision, free elections were held. | |||
==Multinational== | |||
===2000 global health=== | |||
Among the discussions in the 2000 [[National Intelligence Council]] study on global health is the impact of [[AIDS]] in Cambodia. | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist|2}} | {{reflist|2}} | ||
[[Category:Suggestion Bot Tag]] | |||
Latest revision as of 06:00, 1 November 2024
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 This article discusses activities of the United States intelligence community specific to Cambodia, and multinational matters, such as U.S. intelligence and global health, not specific to Southeast Asia or the Asia-Pacific region. NationalCambodia 1954A National Intelligence Estimate of August 3 projected relatively little Communist activity in Cambodia as Viet Minh withdraw. With outside help, the Cambodians should be able to build a security apparatus.[1] Cambodia 1967President Richard Nixon asked Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger to explore two potential CIA actions in Cambodia:
After discussion in the 303 Committee, which was then the approval group for US covert actions, the committee endorsed the first, although the CIA recommended against it for two reasons. They believed it would take effort away from operations in South Vietnam, and also would have questionable effectiveness but high cost against the large North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. As far as the second, CIA has identified a number of Cambodian army officers who are actively involved in supporting communist forces in South Vietnam, but does not now have direct, secure and controlled access to any of these officers. They doubt any of the officers involved in the arms traffic would be now susceptible to bribery both because of the profits accruing to them from such operations as well as the personal political risks entailed in a relationship involving the United States. Further, they pointed out that if recent U.S. diplomatic approaches to Cambodia result in the formal resumption of full diplomatic relations, CIA will gain an operating base for improved intelligence collection and covert action. With such a base, they would have a better chance to convince Prince Sihanouk that it is in his best interest to make an honest effort to reduce or halt the arms traffic. Kissinger recommended continuing to monitor rather than taking action. There is no record on file of a Presidential decision on these matters.[2]. Cambodia 1969A February 19 memorandum from Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger to President Richard Nixon proposed an bombing attack by B-52 aircraft against what was believed to be COSVN in Cambodia. In this discussion, specific CIA analysis was not discussed, but Kissinger indicated that he believed the target information to be correct:
Note that no intelligence personnel were present. At a 11 October 1969 meeting with Nixon, Kissinger, United States Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Attorney General John Mitchell and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (i.e., no CIA personnel) [4], several pertinent observations were made. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Earle Wheeler cited two COSVN Resolutions, with the inference that COSVN existed as an organizational entity. In the subsequent discussion of bombing options, there were no mention of COSVN's physical location. Cambodia 1970Prince Norodom Sihanouk claimed in his 1973 book that the CIA engineered his ouster in March 1970.[5] Weiner's book[6] claims that in April of 1970, CIA analysts did not find evidence of a North Vietnamese COSVN headquarters in Cambodia, but that U.S. President Richard Nixon authorized a ground invasion to locate and destroy a North Vietnamese headquarters in Cambodia should one exist. Cambodia 1972Senator Clifford P. Case sponsored a law effective December 1972 cutting off funds for CIA and private military company operations in Cambodia. Cambodia 1980sThe Reagan Administration sought to apply the Reagan Doctrine of aiding anti-Soviet resistance movements abroad to Cambodia, which was under Vietnamese occupation following the Cambodian genocide carried out by the communist Khmer Rouge. The Vietnamese had installed a communist government led by Khmer Rouge dissident Heng Samrin. According to R. J. Rummel; the Vietnamese invasion, occupation, puppet regime, ongoing guerrilla warfare, and ensuing famine killed 1.2 million Cambodians in addition to the roughly 2 million who had been killed by the Khmer Rouge.[7] The largest resistance movement fighting Cambodia's communist government was largely made up of members of the former Khmer Rouge regime, whose human rights record was among the worst of the 20th century. Therefore, Reagan authorized the provision of aid to a smaller Cambodian resistance movement, a coalition called the Khmer People's National Liberation Front,[8] known as the KPNLF and then run by Son Sann; in an effort to force an end to the Vietnamese occupation. Eventually, the Vietnamese withdrew, and Cambodia's communist regime fell.[9] Then, under United Nations supervision, free elections were held. Multinational2000 global healthAmong the discussions in the 2000 National Intelligence Council study on global health is the impact of AIDS in Cambodia. References
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